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terminus
Date: 28/9/2007 2:27 pm
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final version of the paper synthesising the substantive contributions of stakeholders to provide a background for discussions at the Rio meeting has been released, thankfully about a month in advance of the release of that for the Athens meeting (though so far only in English).
As well as summarising 28 submissions from 13 contributors (which, let's face it, is rather a paltry number), the synthesis paper also endeavours to cover, in a broad-brush sort of way, some of the recurrent arguments made by stakeholders at or to the open consultation meetings, and the active discussion threads from the Secretariat's (also rather sparse)
Web forum.
The Synthesis Paper is structured much like last year's, in beginning with the four - sorry, now five - themes of the substantive agenda, and concluding with consideration of the role and functioning of the IGF.
Within the first section, I will focus only on the new theme of Critical Internet Resources, since we all know that's where the real action will be in Rio, and since contributions on the other substantive themes tend to be rather shallow and monotonous (I'm sorry, but they do).
Anyone who has been following the IGF for long will be aware that the name "ICANN" will rarely be uttered, in favour of a range of euphamisms. Well, this one (in the summary of China's submission) takes the cake: "the relevant stakeholders currently responsible for the mechanisms and structures involved in the status quo of the current administration of critical resources". Wow.
It must be said that discussion of this theme in the written contributions is very one-sided, and its implications on their face disturbing for the Internet community. For example, the proposition that, by reason of their responsibility for the management of resources that affect state public policy concerns, organisations such as ICANN "became agents of the state and should be subject to state regulation and oversight" represents a position accepted by only a minority of stakeholders, yet it is presented in the synthesis report without comment.
I cannot blame this on the Secretariat, however. Where is ICANN's substantive submission to the IGF? Why do the RIRs have nothing to say? Why is ISOC's contribution silent on Critical Internet Resources? Hopefully they will not be so reticent in Rio.
Moving on to comments on the role and functioning of the IGF (divided into general comments, the annual meeting, the Advisory Group, the Dynamic Coalitions and "The Way Forward"), again many contributions re-tread all-too-familiar ground (the ITAA thinks the IGF's success drives from its lack of decision-making capacity? Get outta here.)
Having said that, there were a few insightful and original contributions, and the synthesis paper draws attention to one of those, by IT for Change. As summarised in the paper, this contribution
recommended that the IGF work towards a multi-stakeholder "standing IGF committee" (or working group) along the lines of the Working Group on Internet Governance (WGIG), which would give regular, non-binding recommendations on different Internet governance issues. This body could follow the WGIG model of providing a consensus-based recommendations report, and of placing other strong points and proposals that do not get complete consensus into a background paper.
The synthesis paper also frankly acknowledges that "Different views were held as regards the purpose of the annual meeting of the IGF." It was here that a summary of my contribution (essentially just constituted by excerpts from my thesis) was placed. Although my position was correctly contrasted with that of those who saw the IGF's annual meeting as an end in itself, I'm not sure that I would agree with the characterisation of my views as advocating "reorganizing the IGF meeting to be less of an annual event and more of a process that would coordinate intersessional and regional events".
In respect of the Advisory Group, I admit I have been a bit wishy-washy in my thesis (at least as it now stands in draft) in allowing intergovernmental organisations and governments equal representation. In truth, I see merit in the view recorded in the synthesis paper that this over-represents governmental interests, which should be redressed when the Advisory Group is reappointed. Although not stated in the submission (nor in my thesis), this could be done by splitting off the Internet technical community from civil society and the private sector, which would give non-government stakeholders a three-fifths majority.
My own submission also makes a re-appearance in this section, and is fairly accurately summarised as calling
for a new, democratically or consensually appointed multi-stakeholder body. This new body would be responsible for many of the activities currently done by the Advisory Group and the Secretariat, including the preparation of the agenda, programme and synthesis papers. It would also be responsible for creating background briefing reports that would be used by the plenary and would produce responses to the substantive issues, based on its assessment of the consensus within the plenary. This group would also be responsible for choosing the Secretariat and any necessary Advisory Groups. The multi-stakeholder body itself could be selected by a form of nominating committee process that would select "a balanced group of individuals appointed as representatives of their stakeholder groups".
The synthesis paper reports the growing view, now accepted even by the Secretariat, that it will be necessary to develop some criteria for the recognition of Dynamic Coalitions, and that it is not appropriate to use this label to refer to pure advocacy groups, or to bodies constituted by members from only a single stakeholder group. My submission was sourced for the suggestion that there should also be procedures in place for the receipt of the output of Dynamic Coalitions by the plenary body.
Apart from the
reservations I last expressed regarding its format, the synthesis paper is a competent encapsulation of most of the disparate views of stakeholders coming into the Rio meeting. Its main substantive deficiencies reflect those of the relatively few and sometimes perfunctory submissions on which it is based. My main hope is that, unlike last year's paper, people will actually read it before the meeting, the moderators will refer to it and use it as a background paper in questioning the panel, and that it will inform the views expressed on the floor.